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Abstract 
 
The Western Balkans have seen rapid changes since the end of the violent conflicts in the 
1990s. The European Union (EU) has been one of the main drivers for change, focusing on 
the political, economic and social transformation of the region to prepare the countries for 
membership in the Union. This introduction to the special issue will clarify the key terms and 
their interaction in the Western Balkans. EU enlargement has never before been this complex 
and inter-connected with processes of state-building and democratization. The focus on 
conditionality as the main tool of the EU in the region has had positive and negative results. It 
can be argued that the EU is actively involved in state-building processes and therefore the 
term EU Member State Building will be used to explain the engagement of the Union with the 
countries in the region. This paper will discuss the concept of EU Member State Building, its 
potential and its pitfalls. It will be demonstrated that the stabilization of the region is unlikely 
to take place without an active role of the EU, however the current approach has reached its 
limits and it is time to think about alternative options to integrate the Western Balkans into 
European structures.  
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Introduction 
There is general consensus among political elites and academics that the countries in the 
Western Balkans1 undergo complex transformations and witness far-reaching changes to their 
political, social and economic systems. This special issue will assess these complicated 
processes from the perspectives of Europeanization, state-building and democratization. 
What will be demonstrated is that while each country faces some important unique historical 
legacies and current problems to deal with, there are three general trends that can be 
observed. First, all countries of the Western Balkans want to join the European Union (EU). 
They are part of the EU’s Stabilization and Association Process (SAP) and as such have to 
implement the acquis communautaire of the EU. This Europeanization process in itself will 
lead to far-reaching changes in the political, social and economic systems. Second, all states 
in the Western Balkans have weak state structures and some of them, such as Bosnia and 
Kosovo are contested in their very existence as independent states. Consequently it can be 
argued that the establishment of stateness, meaning efficient governance institutions, full 
control over the state’s territory and good neighborly relations with other states in the region 
remains a key challenge. To address some of the fundamental weaknesses in these states 
important reforms will have to be implemented to ensure democratic decision-making, the 
rule of law, the protection of minorities and the establishment of an efficient economic and 
social system. Finally, all states in the Western Balkans are young democracies. While 
democracy is deeply-rooted in some of them such as Croatia, other countries are still 
undergoing important steps towards consolidating democratic structures. Challenges such as 
the enforcement of the rule of law, the fight against corruption in the bureaucracy and the 
establishment of cooperative patterns between government and opposition remain. As the 
contributions to this special issue will demonstrate, overcoming these weaknesses in 
democratic governance will be a long-term process and require deep changes to the political 
system and even the political culture.  
 This introduction will offer a first definition of the key terms of Europeanization, 
state-building and democratization and will discuss these processes in the context of the 
Western Balkans. In a second step it will be demonstrated how these transformations are 
connected and that we can talk about an EU Member State Building process in the region. 
Finally, part three will introduce the papers of this special issue and summarize their main 
arguments in the context of EU Member State Building. The majority of papers in this special 
issue have been previously presented at the UACES annual conference 2011 in Cambridge, 
UK. This also underlines how important it is to study the integration of the Western Balkans 
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into the EU as an essential part of European Studies and therefore demonstrates the transition 
of a region that used to be studied in conflict resolution classes and in courses that focused on 
international intervention. The main theme of this special issue is the recognition that the 
Western Balkans are part of Europe and that their destiny lies in the EU’s hands. The 
challenge for the region is not anymore about peace-building but about a process of 
preparation for membership in European structures. The integration of the Western Balkans 
into the EU has the potential to become the single most successful foreign policy 
achievement of the Union. In its importance it is probably comparable to overcoming the 
century-old conflicts between Germany and France that stood at the beginning of the 
European integration process. Ending the violence in the Western Balkans, establishing 
efficient and modern democratic states and integrating these states into the EU are massive 
tasks. However, considering the possible alternatives of long-term instability it is certainly a 
task worthwhile.  
 
Definition of Terms 
Before we will be able to analyze the complex process of EU Member State Building in the 
Western Balkans and its main characteristics and challenges, it is important to clarify the 
most important definitions used by the authors of this special issue. 
 When describing the process of Europeanization, the most common definition refers 
to a 
Process of a) construction, b) diffusion and c) institutionalization of formal and informal rules, 
procedures, policy paradigms, styles, ‘ways of doing things’, and shared beliefs and norms 
which are first defined and consolidated in the EU policy process and then incorporated in the 
logic of domestic (national and subnational) discourse, political structures and public choices 
(Radaelli 30).  
Europeanization in this context is understood as the influence of the EU on its Member 
States’ political, economic and social systems (Quaglia, et.al). It is argued that the EU 
as a political system impacts on its Member States because decisions taken at a 
European level can have a long-term effect on each individual Member State (Hix). The 
best example of the impact of Europeanization in its classic understanding is the 
introduction of a new currency, the Euro as a result of the Maastricht Treaty.  
 However, the countries of the Western Balkans are not Member States of the 
EU. Nevertheless, they are affected by important changes as a result of decisions taken 
in Brussels. Because they are part of the accession process they have to implement the 
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acquis communautaire, the EU’s legal foundation and they have to reform their political 
and economic systems to comply with the Copenhagen Criteria, which specify the 
conditions for membership in the Union. Therefore, as Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier 
(The Europeanization; The Politics of EU Enlargement) have demonstrated, the EU can 
have a massive impact on countries before joining the Union. The process of integration 
into the Union therefore results in the implementation of a massive amount of EU laws, 
regulations and directives, changes to the bureaucracy and far-reaching changes to 
constitutional norms on citizenship, voting rights, property rights and the creation of a 
legal basis for the transfer of sovereignty to the EU (Claes). 
 When talking about “Europeanization, South East European style,” it has been 
pointed out that this is an externally-driven, coercive and increasingly demanding 
process (Anastasakis 82). Roberto Belloni (317) has argued that the “Balkans have 
changed Europe and the EU as much as the EU is currently trying to change its south-
eastern neighbours.” He concludes that the Europeanization of the countries in the 
former Yugoslavia should focus on “the coherence of [European] policy towards the 
region, focus less on a Europeanized political elite and more on citizens and civil 
society organizations, and carefully deploy incentives and rewards to sustain the reform 
process that is already under way” (314).  
 The European integration of this region is complex and a long-term process. It is 
multi-layered and the EU itself faces completely new challenges in the region. Florian 
Bieber has demonstrated that there are a number of minimalist states in the region, 
“which barely fulfill functions generally associated with states” (1784). Bieber argues 
that the state structures that were created after the end of violence in Bosnia, Kosovo 
and the state union of Serbia and Montenegro were aimed at resolving the conflicts but 
were unable to provide state structures that would enable these states to establish an 
efficient monopoly of the use of force, democratic decision-making capacities and 
embedded statehood (1785-1790). States that are unable to perform basic state functions 
such as providing security, ensuring a basic level of social welfare and providing 
political incentives for economic growths are the result of the violent break-up of the 
former Yugoslavia. The focus of EU integration in the Western Balkans therefore is on 
state-building, which aims at rebuilding fundamental governance structures such as 
political institutions, civil societies and economic and welfare systems. The focus of 
state-building is on the reconstruction of whole countries and societies, including their 
democratization and the establishment of a functional civil society (Etzioni 102). The 
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EU therefore becomes an actor in the state-building process in the Western Balkans. 
Through the process of Europeanization it is hoped that the EU will use its influence 
and the final incentive of membership to promote the establishment of efficient state 
structures and administrations that are capable of coping with the pressures of 
membership in the Union. However, it has been discussed that external state-building 
has had only limited success in the past (Paris; Sisk and Paris; Ghani and Lockhart). 
David Chandler (3) argues that “international statebuilding intervention is necessary but 
not sufficient.” Europeanization as the process of the preparation of the countries in the 
Western Balkans for their membership in the EU therefore focuses on the establishment 
of efficient state structures, including the reconstruction of economic and welfare 
systems after violent conflicts in the region. The “carrot” of membership in the EU is 
used to encourage political elites in these countries to implement important reforms to 
strengthen state capacity and enhance democratic decision-making. In fact, 
democratization is a further feature of Europeanization in the region. The first 
Copenhagen Criteria focuses on democratic governance, minority protection and the 
rule of law.2 Democratization in this context refers to the establishment and 
strengthening of democratic governance. This includes free and fair elections, a 
professional parliamentary service, cooperation between government and opposition, 
civil society input into government activities and legislation and the establishment of 
Rechtsstaatlichkeit (rule of law). Scholars of democratization have focused on the 
establishment of political institutions, civil society and a changing political culture in 
which election results are respected, conflicts are solved by political and legal means 
and the judiciary is independent from political influence (Diamond, The Spirit of 
Democracy; Developing Democracy; Merkel; Linz and Stepan). What is clear at this 
point is that the process of state-building is necessarily connected to democratization in 
the Western Balkans, because the establishment and strengthening of democratic 
governance remains a fundamental principle of external (and internal) state-building and 
consolidation in the region. The Europeanization of the Western Balkans refers to a 
process, in which the EU supports the implementation of European standards (defined 
by the EU’s conditionality) in the Western Balkans. Because of the authoritarian past 
and the violent break-up of Yugoslavia, democratization and state-building are 
fundamental elements of this Europeanization. The EU, in other words, is building 
states which can eventually join the Union.   
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EU Member State Building      
The previous discussion demonstrates that the countries in the Western Balkans undergo 
a complicated transformation. They are deeply embedded in the process of EU 
integration via the SAP, which focuses not only on the Copenhagen Criteria but also on 
regional cooperation and reconciliation. All countries with the exception of Kosovo 
have signed Stabilization and Association Agreements (SAA) with the EU over the last 
years, which legally bind them into a process of political and economic integration. In 
addition, Croatia, Macedonia and Montenegro have received candidate status and 
Croatia has concluded EU accession negotiations in 2011. The European Commission 
has recently suggested that Croatia should join the EU in July 20133 and that 
Montenegro and Macedonia should start membership negotiations.4  
 The Europeanization of the Western Balkans is a process that focuses on 
stabilizing and reforming the political and economic systems in these countries by 
encouraging local elites to implement “European standards.” At the same it is envisaged 
that the process will help to overcome the legacies of the recent past and encourage 
regional cooperation, reconciliation and result in cross-border synergies. To some extent 
this process has been very successful and since the end of violence in Kosovo in 1999 
and in Macedonia in 2000 there has been no major eruption of violence in the region 
with the exception of the riots in Kosovo in 2004. Furthermore, the states in the Western 
Balkans have become stabilized and with the exception of Bosnia and Kosovo are not 
contested as such anymore. Important forums of regional cooperation have been 
created, first through the Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe and its successor the 
Regional Cooperation Council, but also in important other areas such as energy and 
security.  
The Europeanization of the region focuses on active state-building and 
democratization. In contrast to the earlier enlargement rounds in 2004 and 2007, which 
saw 12 Central and Eastern European States join the Union, new challenges have forced 
the EU and its Member States to outline new criteria and new methods for the 
integration process. Because most of the Western Balkans countries are post-conflict 
societies,5 the integration process necessarily needed to address some of the legacies of 
these conflicts, in particular economic reconstruction, political institution-building, 
reconciliation and regional cooperation. Furthermore, all states in the region with the 
exception of Albania have declared their independence from Yugoslavia and some of 
them, such as Bosnia and Kosovo, have never been independent before. Others, such as 
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Croatia and Serbia have never had fully democratic polities before and have never 
existed as independent states within their current borders. Weak statehood and weak 
democratic institutions are therefore characteristic for the region. The existence of semi-
authoritarian regimes in Croatia and Serbia until 2000 (Zakošek) and the outbreak of 
violence in Macedonia in 2000 demonstrate that these political systems were far from 
consolidated in the first years after the break-up of Yugoslavia. 
The process of EU Member State Building is multi-layered. It started in 1999, 
when the European Council defined the SAP and added cooperation with the ICTY and 
regional co-operation as additional conditions for all countries in the Western Balkans. 
While the European perspective for the countries of the region has been upheld by the 
European Council in the Feira Meeting (June 2000) and in Thessaloniki (June 2003), the 
need for reform in the region remained a constant and ever-visible condition. The 
conclusion of Thessaloniki therefore reads: 
During the last four years, the European Union’s policy of Stabilisation and Association has 
contributed critically to progress achieved throughout the region in promoting stability and in 
bringing the countries closer to the Union. It now needs to be strengthened and enriched with 
elements from the enlargement process, so that it can better meet the new challenges, as the 
countries move from stabilisation and reconstruction to sustainable development, association and 
integration into European structures. The Union’s thus enriched policy of Stabilisation and 
Association, including the Stabilisation and Association Agreements, will constitute the overall 
framework for the European course of the Western Balkan countries, all the way to their future 
accession (EU Commission, The Thessaloniki Agenda for the Western Balkans) 
The process is clearly defined: the countries of the Western Balkans want to join the EU 
and the EU is willing to accept them, if they fulfill the conditions. The conditions, 
defined by the EU without any input from the potential candidate countries have 
however been specified further. Not only did the EU attempt to overcome the results 
and the legacies of the (most recent) past by focusing on the co-operation with the ICTY 
as a form of retributive justice (without encouraging local forms of reconciliation), but 
also regional co-operation became a way of encouraging the states of the former 
Yugoslavia to overcome their recent violent past and to model the EU in miniature. It is 
consequently not surprising that the main thing regional co-operation has resulted in is a 
free trade agreement among the countries of the region and some co-operation in 
energy, security and police matters. However, the lack of joint negotiations with the EU 
(as occurred in Eastern Europe) means that the incentives for true regional co-operation 
are low. In fact, the border dispute between Croatia and Slovenia threatened Croatian 
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accession at a point where membership negotiations were nearly completed. 
Furthermore, regional co-operation has not resulted in long-term co-operation and 
synergies that supported joint projects to move EU integration forward. Inter-state 
relations remain volatile, as the situation in Northern Kosovo demonstrates.  
 Furthermore, over the last ten years conditionality has become even further 
qualified and specified. The EU refers continuously to other organizations in their 
progress reports and adopts their legal framework as part of the EU’s conditionality. In 
that respect the Progress Report for Bosnia mentions the decision of the European Court 
of Human Rights in the Finci/Sejdic case and connects the resolution of this case to 
Bosnia’s progress in EU integration. The Venice Commission is another institution, 
which has been mentioned numerous times over the last years. Their recommendations 
become part of the EU’s reform suggestions. The International Criminal Court also 
features prominently in most country progress reports, because most countries have 
signed bilateral agreements with the USA, which forbid the prosecution and transferal 
of US citizens. In many respects it is easy to understand the EU’s reliance on other 
institutions and their guidelines. On the one side it has to be mentioned that EU 
conditionality is very vague and even the Copenhagen Criteria are rather political than 
technical, leaving a lot of room for interpretation. On the other side, there has been a 
trend in EU enlargement to specify general conditions by referring to more specific 
policies of other organizations. This occurred most openly in the case of Eastern 
Europe, when the countries in East and Central Europe had to implement the standard 
minority rights suggestions of the OSCE, and the High Commissioner for Minority 
Issues became a key actor in minority rights legislation.  
 Specifying conditionality as such therefore has been common practice in EU 
enlargement before and so has the reliance on other institutions, what however is new in 
the Western Balkans is the direct intervention mechanisms for the EU when its 
conditionality is not met. These direct intervention practices occur on three levels. First, 
the EU can intervene directly in the political process, as is the case in Bosnia through 
the High Representative and the EU Special Representative, which were united in one 
position until 2011. The EU Police Mission and a small military mission mean that the 
EU is also directly involved in questions of internal (and external) security as well as 
security sector reform. In Kosovo, the EU is involved in the appointment of the 
International Civilian Representative, who oversees the democratization process in the 
country and has a right to veto legislation. Furthermore, the EU’s rule of law mission 
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EULEX has intervened in internal investigation and local court cases. In Macedonia, the 
EU Special Representative has become the main moderator between Macedonian and 
Albanian parties and remains the main mediator in case of conflict.  
Second, the EU can support certain parties, laws, actions and persons directly. 
The elections in Serbia in 2008 were heavily influenced by the EU’s support for 
President Tadic directly in the Presidential election, and for his Democratic Party (DS) 
in the following parliamentary elections. The elections were won by Tadic and the DS, 
and consequently Serbia’s EU integration progressed at high speed. The EU made it 
clear that an electoral outcome not in its favor would result in a slowdown and potential 
reverse of the EU integration process. Similarly, the EU continues to support openly 
moderate parties in Bosnia, although with less success than in the case of Serbia.  
 Finally, the EU can threaten to block further progress in the EU enlargement 
process or to stop financial assistance. David Chandler (The EU and Southeastern 
Europe) has pointed out, that in the fragile societies of the Western Balkans it does not 
matter if the EU intervenes directly or threatens to withhold some funds, both result in a 
crisis of local democracy and illegitimate pressure on democratically elected officials. 
He argues that EU conditionality has focused not on formal democratic principles but 
on governance and “administrative practices and policy choices of governments” 
(Chandler, EU Statebuilding, 596). The EU, in other words, has focused much more on 
policy-output rather than on the organizational principles of the polity itself. This is a 
clear shift from the conditionality applied in Eastern and Central Europe and is 
commonly connected to colonialism, international trusteeship or state-building rather 
than enlargement. It is in this interference in the internal affairs of independent states 
and the specific application of Brussels-designed solutions to the region, that the 
reference to the European Raj finds its truths (Knaus/Martin). 
EU Member State Building therefore qualifies as a new model of enlargement. It 
comes, however, with a number of negative side-effects. For one, there is the obvious 
problem of democratic justification of extensive EU intervention in the internal affairs 
of sovereign states (even if these states have declared to join the EU). It might be 
justified to argue that potential and recognized candidate countries have already 
announced that they are happy to pool some of their sovereignty to Brussels however, 
they certainly have not declared that they are happy with Brussels’ involvement in 
sensitive policy areas. We should imagine that the EU would tell Italy that its police 
have failed in the fight against organized crime (which probably it has) and that it 
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therefore needs to reform its police units according to principles put together by 
officials of the European Commission. We can imagine the outcry that would occur and 
how Italy would defend its right to decide on the organization of its police units. Yet, 
Bosnian politicians were forced to agree on an EU-designed reform of the police.  The 
Bosnian police reform also highlights a second negative effect of EU Member State 
Building. The EU has no common practices on policing and the attempt to design a new 
police structure for Bosnia failed and caused a massive political crisis in the country in 
2008. Because the EU focuses more on policy, it is more likely that the EU will focus 
on areas where there is no European standard and consequently its conditionality and 
reform suggestions might conflict not only with local traditions, but also with practices 
in some EU Member States. The Copenhagen Criteria outline basic structural conditions 
that countries have to fulfill before joining the EU. When these Criteria were established 
in 1993 they were kept very general on purpose to accommodate the institutional, 
economic, societal and legal differences among the current and future Member States. 
By shifting the focus from these general structures towards more in-depths policy 
suggestions, EU conditionality attempts to fake a unity in European policies, which does 
not exist. Fundamentally, the EU is not a state and many policy areas remain in the 
domain of the Member States, which consequently will result in policy output. 
However, the different legal and political cultures in Europe have always been seen as a 
value rather than a problem, not at least by the founding fathers of the EU. By focusing 
on specific policies in its conditionality towards the Western Balkans, the EU pretends 
that diversity itself is not a value anymore, since “European standards” are the norm that 
needs to be fulfilled. There is thirdly the negative side effect that the EU claims to act 
on behalf of the citizens of the countries, yet their voice and their concerns are not 
addressed through EU Member State Building. If anything, they become more 
anachronistic with the EU, their governments and politics in general, which can be very 
dangerous in a region, where nationalism is still a strong force. If the EU wants to 
engage more actively in the region and motivate the local politicians to implement 
important reforms, which are desperately needed, then it should support citizens’ 
initiatives, local NGOs and those parties that form around social and political issues 
other than nationalism. The core criticism of EU Member State Building however, has 
to be the fact that it is not building Member States. It is creating new dependencies, 
establishing new dominant party systems and encouraging new veto players, which will 
make EU integration more complex and time-consuming in the future. The reason why 
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Eastern enlargement went relatively smoothly is because there was a general consensus 
among the citizens and the elites on the advantages of membership in the EU. It was 
seen as the next logical step after many countries gained their full (ideological) 
independence only after 1989. In the Western Balkans such a consensus remains 
missing. While generally a majority of citizens supports EU integration in all countries, 
most of them do so conditionally. Serbs are willing to sacrifice EU integration if it 
means keeping Kosovo, while politicians of the Republika Sprska in Bosnia have made 
it clear that their first priority is to protect the Serbs in Bosnia. At the same time 
Kosovo’s progress will depend on a settlement between Albanians and Serbs in Kosovo 
and between Kosovo and Serbia on the status of the former Serbian province. 
Macedonian politicians want to join under the condition that the country will enter the 
Union under its constitutional name of Republic of Macedonia, a demand heavily 
contested and vetoed by Greece. It comes as no surprise that Montenegro has made the 
most advances in EU integration over the last five years. The country enjoys relative 
prosperity due to tourism and Foreign Direct Investment (FDI). While the governing 
party DPS and the opposition agree on little, EU integration is accepted by them as the 
only option to ensure Montenegro’s continued economic development and its future as a 
tiny state in South-East Europe. Montenegro’s success in EU integration therefore is the 
result of two lucky combinations; firstly the status of the country as such is not 
contested either internally or externally. Secondly, while opposition and government are 
polarized and disagree on fundamental issues such as NATO membership, the 
relationship Instead of focusing on integration as a stand-alone issue, the EU should try 
to solve the open status questions as quickly as possible. This includes openly pushing 
for a constitutional reform in Bosnia, putting pressure on Serbia and Kosovo to come to 
a joint agreement and influencing both Macedonia and Greece to come to a joint 
agreement. In the light of the current financial crisis it seems as if the EU is in a 
particularly good position to influence Greece’s negative stance. The EU and its 
Member States should make it clear that there will be no progress in integration if these 
status questions are not resolved in mutual agreement. At the same time it should be 
pointed out that those actors that are seen as particularly destructive to a solution should 
be punished for example by limiting their financial support from the EU or by isolating 
them and fostering new coalitions. The key remains a focus on civil society and those 
parties that address that focus on economic and political development. The EU should 
shift its focus away from political elites to local leaders, NGO representatives and 
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indeed local citizens and support their effects to overcome the past and work together 
for a better (European) future.    
 
Structure of this special issue 
The papers in this special issue all address different elements of EU Member State 
Building, some more directly such as Gezim Krasniqi’s comparison of state and nation-
building in Kosovo and Albania, and some more indirectly like Jelena Dzankic, who 
looks at the internal and external factors that contributed to the development of the 
Montenegrin party system. What all papers have in common is their focus on 
Europeanization, State-Building and Democratization in the Western Balkans. The 
authors all agree that the EU has had and continues to have a massive influence on the 
political development in the region. Nevertheless, it is also important to take the internal 
developments in the region into account, something that has not yet been understood 
fully in Brussels. Focusing on internal dynamics in party interaction and obstruction, 
Outi Keranen demonstrates how even the best attempts to implement the Dayton Peace 
Agreement by international actors have been resisted by different parties in Bosnia. She 
describes how different projects of state-building have undermined the Bosnian state 
and continue to contest the legal existence of Bosnia and Herzegovina. As described 
above, this questioning of the status has resulted in heavy EU intervention, but the EU 
has been unable to solve the crisis, despite continued lip-service to Bosnian unity. What 
is needed is a new agreement on the Bosnian state, a constitutional reform that includes 
all actors and brings together the different demands by ensuring the creation of a 
functioning state and the protection of the different peoples in Bosnia at the same time. 
That both is not impossible can be learnt from Spain, Belgium, Canada and India. 
Valery Perry demonstrates how some of the ideas of the OSCE have had a positive 
impact on Bosnia but she also demonstrates the unwillingness of key Bosnian actors to 
change and contribute to the reform process. She argues that the weakness of the OSCE 
lies in the fact that its implementation powers were limited and that it often did not 
receive the support of other international organizations in Bosnia, such as the Office of 
the High Representative. She nevertheless concludes that external actors can have an 
influence if they work together with local officials and if they have the power to 
implement deep changes even against the resistance of local obstructers. Gezim 
Krasniqi discusses the role of minorities and external actors in the state-building and 
democratization projects in Albania and Kosovo. He demonstrates that historical 
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experiences and the relationship with the kin-state play a key role for the different 
attitudes of the Greek minority in Albania and the Serb minority in Kosovo. What 
however remains strikingly important is the need for willingness among the minority 
and majority population to live together and work together in the common state, which 
both claim to be their home. In particular in relations to Kosovo, Krasniqi demonstrates 
how international actors have influenced the state-building and democratization project 
and he picks up on some of the criticism on EU Member State Building. Once again it 
becomes obvious that it can only be the EU and its representatives that bring Kosovo 
Albanians and Serbs as well as Kosovo and Serbia together and solve the complex issue 
of Kosovo’s status. The disunity among European countries on the Kosovo issues 
contributes to the escalation of the conflict and European ignorance can easily create the 
next frozen conflict. Jelena Dzankic’s paper analyses the development of identity and 
party politics in Montenegro since the break-up of Yugoslavia at the beginning of the 
1990s. She demonstrates how identification patterns have changed and how the split of 
the DPS has resulted in a massive reconfiguration of identity and party politics in 
Montenegro. She particularly focuses on the internal factors that have led to the changes 
and demonstrates that while there is a deep split between opposition and ruling party; 
Montenegro as such is not contested as an independent country anymore, despite the 
creation of a party system along ethno-national lines. Marija Risteska discusses the role 
of the EU in good governance promotion in Macedonia in her contribution. She comes 
to the conclusion that good governance is an essential element of EU conditionality; 
however, the EU continues to focus on short-term policy changes rather than long-term 
structural and cultural changes. This results in a lack of deep-rooted reforms and there is 
little change in the actual administrative practices in Macedonia. We can see how EU 
Member State Building tries to change policies rather than polities (meaning the 
fundamental structures of a state) and instead of focusing on democratic and legal 
structures in the administration and the government apparatus, the EU focuses on 
efficiency and effectiveness of administrative processes. The EU’s limited impact on 
good governance in Macedonia demonstrates the limits of EU Member State Building 
and indeed can be seen as a classic example of how EU policies fail to prepare the 
candidate for membership. Bernhard Stahl looks at the relationship between the EU and 
Serbia. He comes to the conclusion that there is a “civilizatory conflict” between these 
two actors. He attributes this in particular to the dominance of the national discourse in 
Serbian politics and the EU’s character as a post-modern (indeed post-nation state) 
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political system. The different approaches and perspectives cannot be overcome by 
simply imposing the EU’s will, but will ultimately have to lead to a cultural change in 
Serbia as well. Following the logic of argument presented above, the EU should focus 
on establishing democratic and liberal structures in Serbia’s political, cultural and 
economic system and therefore contribute to its inclusion in the European market. Over 
time the European discourse will become more important than the nationalist discourse 
and old structures can change. This indeed will need time, passions and a lot of financial 
and political resources, but it is certainly a worthwhile exercise if we only imagine the 
alternative and a return of nationalist anti-democratic forces in Serbia. Finally, Jens 
Woelk summarizes all papers, by discussing their contextual contributions to the current 
debate and by looking for joint themes and further research questions.  
 
The papers published in this special issue were first presented at the UACES Annual 
Conference in 2011 in Cambridge, UK and it is planned to contribute a panel on the EU 
and the Western Balkans annually to the UACES Annual Conferences in the future. 
There is much to be discussed and debated. We hope to have made some contributions 
that will encourage further debates. 
 
 
                                                             
1
 The term “countries of the Western Balkans” refers to the former Yugoslav Republics of Croatia, Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, Serbia, Macedonia and Montenegro (minus Slovenia, which joined the EU in 2004). It also 
includes Kosovo and Albania. I will use the terms “Western Balkans,” the former Yugoslavia and Southeastern 
Europe to describe these countries.  
2
 These criteria can be seen at: www.ec.europa.eu/enlargement/enlargement.../criteria/index_en.htm (05 
December 2011).   
3
 See the European Commission’s Opinion on the Application for Accession to the European Union by the 
Republic of Croatia. (European Commission Opinion on the Application for Accession). 
4
 See the Progress Reports for Montenegro (European Commission Montenegro 2011 Progress Report) and 
Macedonia (European Commission Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia 2011 Progress Report).    
5
 This certainly applies to Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo and Serbia. Montenegro was also part of 
the Yugoslav involvement in the Croatian, Bosnian and Kosovo War and the violence in Macedonia did not end 
up in a civil war because the EU and NATO intervened early. Albania has also seen numerous violent clashes in 
the 1990s and the breakdown of the so-called pyramid scheme ended in de-facto anarchy and violence between 
different social groups in Albania.   
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